Story Highlights:
• Swaptions protect against interest rate extremes and can benefit both parties
• Payer swaptions and receiver swaptions provide different benefits
• Lehman Brothers and the financial crisis are interesting case studies of swaptions in action
Based upon the nature of the parties involved and their goals in engaging in a swap, swaptions are utilized in one of two ways. A payer swaption allows the buyer to pay a fixed rate and be the beneficiary of the floating leg, which is geared toward companies attempting to guard themselves against high interest rates. A receiver swaption is the converse of this situation in which the buyer pays the floating leg and receives a fixed rate. Corporations making the majority of their money off of interest rates would enter a receiver swaption to protect themselves against rate cuts.
Swaptions give the buyer the right to enter the underlying swap, but much of the appeal lies in the security of not having the obligation. Prior to finalizing the swaption, both the buyer and seller come to terms more than just the underlying swap itself. The exercise and expiration dates of the agreement must be established, creating a period in which the buyer must invoke the option to swap rates with the seller before the exchange expires. This allows a company to evaluate the market swap rate before deciding to continue with the swaption. Perhaps most importantly, a rate of pay must be chosen, which is deemed the strike rate. In addition, payments are calculated using the notional amount in order to have a pre-established system of imbursement, which would also include any amount of amortization. The entire process is conducted over-the-counter, meaning that it is not traded on the exchange.
The over-the-counter nature of swaption trade allows for manipulation of terms and uses. Such has been the case for credit default swaps, as buyers have insured payment in the case of an instrument’s failure. Swaptions have had a profound impact on this market. A good example is the Lehman Brothers situation at the beginning of the economic crisis.
Holders of the debt of Lehman Brothers included large banks that insured the institution’s failure. On the heels of the collapse, they have been forced to pay out the agreed upon rates, furthering the economic crisis of the time. The amount of money bet on the default of Lehman Brothers—comparable to investing in bonds—became much greater than the actual amount of debt. The $190 billion to be paid out is only partially covered by the U.S. Treasury bailout. Without regulation of the over-the-counter swaption market, an estimated two-thirds of the Lehman protection contracts were “speculative.”
Buyers without any true debt from the Lehman collapse will have collected money off of the credit default swaps purchased.
Speculative default protection is the measure by which regulators determine whether or not investors are true holders of debt or mere speculators on the faulting of corporations. This includes hedge fund credit default protection, as the large sums of money being moved are not only being issued insurance, but also being speculated upon. An interesting extension on the idea of swaptions is to view how the Treasury handled this throughout the financial crisis. It seems to have varied from industry to industry as the government and regulators attempted to manage the decline.






